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Spiliopoulos: The Commuications Decency Act of 1996

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF
1996

INTRODUCTION

Imagine sitting at your home computer engaged in an Internet
session. Perhaps you are downloading erotic images from the Web.
Maybe you are sending a graphic e-mail1 message to a friend about an
abortion experience. You could be posting a message on a bulletin
board about being raped in prison.2 Although you may not realize the
consequences of your actions, engaging in sexually explicit speech in
the privacy of your own home may subject you to criminal
prosecution under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("Act"
or "CDA"). 3 As the Internet has grown in size and popularity, the
federal government has become increasingly involved in regulating
obscene, indecent and patently offensive materials found in
cyberspace.4 Despite the Constitution's explicit guarantee of free
speech and expression, the federal government has chosen to control
what its citizens see and say in the sanctity of their home.
The method by which the government has chosen to limit on-line,
sexually explicit materials is the Communications Decency Act of
1996. The CDA is undoubtedly a government-imposed, content1. E-mail is shorthand for electronic mail. See discussion infra part IV. A.
2. Stop Prisoner Rape, Inc. posts graphics, texts and statistics regarding the
incidence of prison rape.
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, § 502, 110 Stat. 133, codified at 47 U.S.C. §
223(a) to (h) (1996).
4. Cyberspace is the term often used to refer to the decentralized, global

medium of communications that links individuals, educational institutions,
governments and corporations by the Internet. For other obscenity provisions, see
sections 1464-1465 and 2251-2252 of Title 18 U.S.C., which were enacted before
the adoption of the Communications Decency Act of 1996; see also United States
v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming the convictions of two computer
bulletin board operators who were convicted after posting graphic descriptions and
images of bestiality, oral sex, incest, sado-masochistic abuse and sex scenes
involving urination on the Internet).
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based restriction on speech. As such, the regulation is subject to strict
scrutiny and can only be upheld if it furthers a compelling
government interest and is narrowly tailored to effectuate that
interest.' The Government has maintained that the CDA was adopted
to keep sexually-explicit Internet content out of the hands of minors.6
The way in which the government has chosen to promote that interest,
however, sweeps far broader than necessary.
This update will begin with an overview of Supreme Court
precedent dealing with indecency and obscenity and then provide an
After an explanation of the
introduction to the Internet.
Communications Decency Act, this update will address how the Act
is fatally vague on its face and unconstitutionally over-inclusive as
applied. This update will also discuss less-restrictive means which
exist to more effectively curb the flow of sexually explicit materials
to minors. Finally, this update will address the unique nature of the
Internet and whether current First Amendment standards for sexually
explicit materials can be applied to cyberspace.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEE
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech."7 The language of the Amendment
is absolute and plain; there is no clause that forbids sexually explicit
materials. However, "[it] is well understood that the right of free
speech is not absolute."8
One method by which the Supreme Court has allowed speech to be
5. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); see also,
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
6. Although protecting the physical and mental well-being of children is
commendable, the author contends that the Communications Decency Act is an
attempt by the government to paternalistically protect society as a whole from the
"dangers" of sexually explicit material.
7. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
8. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); see also, Roth v.

United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (refusing to construe the First Amendment
as protecting every utterance); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1954) (stating
that the rejection of obscenity has always been implicit in the history of the First
Amendment).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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regulated is by the categorization approach. The Court has omitted
certain types of "low value" speech from constitutional protection
simply by categorizing them outside of the First Amendment. 9 A
theory of low-value speech was first enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire where the Supreme Court labeled certain speech,
including fighting words, profanity, libel, lewd and obscene words,
This blanket
as unworthy of First Amendment coverage."
categorization still continues." Recent cases have held that obscenity
has no constitutional protection and may be banned outright in
certain, or all, types of media.1 Unfortunately, this broad restriction
constitutionally-protected
affects
sometimes
speech
on
communications as well.
The CDA explicitly codifies the definitions of obscene, indecent
and patently offensive material from landmark Supreme Court
cases. 3 Therefore, in order to better understand those terms, it is
important to look to Supreme Court precedent dealing with sexuallyrelated materials.
II. THE SUPREME CouRT's TURBULENT HISTORY WITH OBSCENITY

The American government and the Supreme Court have always
tried to protect the community from viewing or hearing certain
9. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.
10. Id. at 572.
11. It is interesting to note that most of these "low value" speech categories
survive only to a limited extent or have been eliminated altogether. Obscenity,
however, continues to be broadly categorized outside the coverage of the First
Amendment to this day.
12. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
13. Perhaps the drafters copied the language verbatim because approval of such
language in the Court's decisions has been read to foreclose a vagueness challenge
in certain media. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT I), 852 F.2d
1332, 1339-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating "If acceptance of the FCC's generic
definition of "indecent" as capable of surviving a vagueness challenge is not
implicit in Pacifica, we have misunderstood Higher Authority and welcome
correction"); see also Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1540-41 (2d
Cir. 1991) (indecent commercial telephone messages); Alliance, 56 F.3d 105, 129
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (cable programming).
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expression."4 But in its quest to protect the public, the Court has
struggled to define speech that is constitutionally protected and
speech that is not." It is therefore important to examine how the
Court "has worked hard to define obscenity and concededly has
failed."16
A. The Commission Report
Throughout the course of it's obscenity litigation, the Supreme
Court has always maintained that protecting the community was a
compelling reason to ban or restrict sexually explicit materials.17 This
governmental interest seemed less compelling when Congress
established the U.S. Commission on Obscenity and Pornography in
1967. The Commission's Report, issued in 1970, concluded that
there was no link between sexually explicit material and sex-related
crimes. 9 In addition, the Commission recommended repealing laws
prohibiting sexual materials for consenting adults."
In the early 1970's the Court's numerous plurality opinions in
obscenity cases indicated that the standard for sexually-related
materials was unsettled." By 1973, many new conservative justices
14. At one time the Court's focus for suppression was on seditious libel until
the twentieth century, when the Courts' attention turned to sexual symbolism. See
MARJORIE HENS, SEX, SIN AND BLASPHEMY, A GUIDE To AMERICA'S
CENSORSHIP WARS 23 (1993).
15. Because the word "pornography" has no fixed legal meaning, it is often

difficult to label it as obscene or indecent. The non-legal definition of
pornography, however, stems from the Greek words, "pome," meaning harlot or
prostitute and "graphos," meaning writing.

16. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. See, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). However, most cases after

Roth centered around the definition of obscenity rather than the interest believed
to justify its control.
18. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1107 (12th ed. 1991).

19. Tim REPORT OF THE COMMISsION

ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY

53

(1970).
20. Id But see, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL
REPORT, at 1037-1213 (stating that obscenity involving sexually violent themes had
a causal link to aggressive, antisocial behavior against women and advocated
increased enforcement of existing laws for sexually violent materials).
21. See, Roth; see also Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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had been appointed by President Richard Nixon to the Court, which
was headed by Chief Justice Burger.22 These appointments created
a conservative swing in the Court which gave it the opportunity to
attain a majority on obscenity issues.23
B. Miller v. California
Although the test for obscenity had been constantly defined and
redefined,24 it was not until 1973 that the Court was "called on to
define the standards which must be used to identify obscene material
25
that a State may regulate" in Miller v. California.
Miller conducted an unsolicited mass mailing campaign to
advertise the sale of illustrated "adult" material. 26 The brochures,
which advertised four books and a film, contained descriptive printed
material as well as pictures and drawings which very explicitly
depicted men and women engaging in sexual activity.27 After
opening the envelope in the presence of his mother, a manager of a
restaurant complained to the police about the unsolicited brochures.28
Miller was arrested and convicted under a California statute which
criminalized the knowing distribution of obscene matter.29
After re-affirming that obscene material is not afforded the
protection of the First Amendment, Chief Justice Burger set forth the
22. By 1973 President Nixon had appointed the last two designees to the Court,

Justices Lewis Powell and now Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
23. Although given the opportunity to attain a majority, it is questionable as to
whether the Court actually did so after numerous plurality opinions.
See, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Memoirs v.
24.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality).
25. 413 U.S. 15, 19-20 (1973).
26. Id. at l6.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 15, 18-19. Miller was convicted of violating § 311.2(a) of the
California Penal Code which reads, in relevant part: "Every person who knowingly:
sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale
or distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or
offers to distribute, or has in his possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or
offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor." Id. at 18.
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test for obscenity. 3 The current legal standard for obscenity is: 1)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; 3' 2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law;32 and 3) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.33 This
standard, formulated over 25 years ago, is still being used to classify
obscene materials.
III. THE SUPREME COURT DELVES INTO THE WORLD OF
INDECENCY

Aside from obscenity, the Court has also had to deal with the issue
of indecent speech. Indecency has been an equally confusing issue
for the Court, as it has failed to distinguish what makes sexuallyrelated materials obscene in one instance and indecent in another.34
This distinction is crucial, however, because if material is obscene, it
has no public value and thus no constitutional protection. If the
material is merely indecent (or offensive), adults have a First
Amendment right to engage in such constitutionally protected
speech.3" It is important to note that the definition of indecency has
30. Id. at 15,23; Roth, 354 U.S. at 476.
31. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24; Roth, 354 U.S. at 489. Miller was the

first case to change from a national to a community standard of review.
32. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court gave examples of what was patently
offensive under subsection (2) as: (a) representations or descriptions of ultimate
sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory finctions, and lewd exhibition of the
genitals. Id. at 25.
33. Id. at 24.
34. Justice Scalia offered no help by stating that pornography is "normally
either indecent or obscene." Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
132 (1978) (Scalia, J., concurring). Equally unhelpful was Justice Stewart's
standard of"I know it when I see it," enunciated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 197 (1984) (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. See, Sable,492 U.S. at 126; FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 747-48 (1978).
Often the courts use circular reasoning to justify their holdings, i.e. indecent speech
is constitutionally protected speech because it has public value, therefore it is
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7

6

Spiliopoulos: The Commuications Decency Act of 1996

1997]

COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT

342

its roots in obscenity jurisprudence,36 often making the line between
protected and unprotected speech indistinguishable.
A. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation - Indecent Yet Not Sexually
Explicit Speech
In the late 1970's, the Court had to grapple with the question of
indecent yet not sexually-related speech in FCC v. Pacifica
37
At issue was whether the Federal Communications
Foundation.
Commission had the power to regulate a radio broadcast that was
indecent but not legally obscene.38
At approximately two o'clock in the afternoon, a New York radio
station owned by Pacific Foundation broadcast a 12-minute
monologue entitled "Filthy Words., 39 The monologue, recorded by
satirist George Carlin, began by referring to the "words you couldn't
say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn't
say, ever."'"' Carlin then began listing those words and repeated them
in various colloquialisms." A man who heard the broadcast while
driving with his young son complained to the Commission.42
The FCC responded by regulating the "offensive" language much
like the law of nuisance.43 The Commission did not put an absolute
prohibition on the broadcast of indecent language, but rather
channeled it to the times of day when children most likely would not
be exposed to it.'
The Court sustained the FCC's order, claiming that broadcast
media had a uniquely pervasive presence which confronted citizens
constitutionally protected speech.
36. Unlike the obscenity standard set forth in Miller, indecent work need not
appeal to the prurient interest or lack serious value to be indecent. See Denver

Area Consortium v. FCC, U.S. _, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality opinion).
37. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
38. Id. at 734.
39. Id. at 729-30.
40. Id. at 729.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 732-33.
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not only in public but "also in the privacy of their own home., 45 The
Court also held that because broadcasting is uniquely accessible to
children, even those too young to read, the FCC had the power to
regulate indecent speech over the airwaves.46 But the Court had not
yet decided the FCC's ability to regulate sexually explicit and
indecent speech until five years after Pacifica.
B. Sable Communicationsv. FCC- Indecent
And Sexually Explicit Speech
A unanimous Court placed sharp limits on the regulation of speech
which was sexually explicit, though not legally pbscene, in Sable
4 7 In 1983, Sable Communications began
Communicationsv. FCC.
offering sexually oriented pre-recorded telephone messages, or "diala-porn," to adult callers.48 Congress enacted a statute 49 which
criminalized commercial transmissions ofsexually-oriented telephone
communications to minors and required the FCC to promulgate
regulations by which dial-a-pom providers could screen out underage
callers.5" The FCC announced the following regulations which would
also act as a defense to prosecution for message providers: (1)
requiring payment by credit card before transmitting the dial-a-porn
messages; (2) using access or identification codes; and (3) scrambling
messages which would be unintelligible without the use of a descrambler, the sale of which would be limited to adults. 5
Congress responded by amending the Communications Act of 1934
which imposed blanket prohibitions on indecent or obscene interstate
45. Id. at 748.
46. Id.

47. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
48. Id.at 117-18.

49. Federal Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L.
No. 98-214 § 8(a),(b), 97 Stat. 1469, 1470, (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
223(b)(1)(A) (1994)). The provision, which is the predecessor to the amendment

at issue in this case, made it a crime to use the telephone to make indecent or
obscene interstate telephone calls for commercial purposes to any person under
eighteen years of age or to any other person without that person's consent.
50. Sable, 492 U.S. at 120.
51. Id. at 121-22.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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commercial telephone messages for adults as well as children. 2 The
government argued that a total ban on indecent telephone
communications was justified because nothing less could prevent
minors from accessing pornographic messages. 3
Justice White, however, struck down the indecency provision of the
Act, stating that sexual expression that is indecent could only be
proscribed to promote a compelling interest. 4 Although the Court
acknowledged the interest in protecting children, the means by which
the government chose far exceeded that which was necessary to
protect minors." The Court concluded that the statute would
essentially limit the "content of adult telephone
conversations to that
56
which is suitable for children to hear.
It is with these guidelines that indecent and obscene Internet
materials must be judged. But before conceptualizing the on-line
materials which the CDA seeks to limit, a basic understanding of the
Internet is necessary.
IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNET

The Internet is a decentralized communications medium which
allows users to globally share information. The Internet is not simply
a computer system or program, rather it is a network which
interconnects other computer networks. Each computer in any
network has the capability to communicate with computers on any
other network within the system. These networks are composed of
personal users, government agencies, educational institutions and
corporations in virtually every country in the world.

52. Id. at 122-23.
53. Id. at 128.
54. Id. at 131.

55. Id. at 116, 126. Evidence supported that the regulations promulgated by the
FCC - credit card verification, identification codes and scrambling - were feasible
and effective ways to promote the compelling interest of protecting minors. Id. at
122.
56. Id. at 131.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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A. Ways To Access Cyberspace
To better understand the Communications Decency Act, it is useful
to understand how pornographic material is disseminated by
computer. 7 There are many ways users may access the system, and
once accessed, there are various methods by which communications
can be exchanged.
Electronic mail or e-mail is perhaps the most commonly known
computer-communications service. E-mail allows people to send
messages to each other via computer and to be stored in the
recipient's computer account until they are read. E-mail can be
distributed one-to-one or it can be sent to numerous people by mass
mailing.
Internet relay chat, or "IRC," creates "chat rooms" where people
can type their message and have it instantaneously viewed by anyone
in the same chat room." Generally, users may access IRC simply by
signing onto a channel. Individuals engaged in real-time chat can
also be "invited" into a private room by another participant to
communicate or trade pictures. 9
Usenet News, or newsgroups, allow like-minded people to'relay
information in an area of special interest.6" Newsgroups permit free
and open exchange of ideas by participants who have the ability to
post messages or pictures, read or view messages, converse with other
users or respond to posted materials.6 Any person can create a
newsgroup at any time.
The World Wide Web ("WWW") is a series of inter-connecting
documents that are stored world-wide in different computers on the
network. When people refer to "surfing the 'Net," they are referring
to jumping from link to link, document to document. Users may
57. Interview with David S. Zaret, Information Technology, Internet Group for
Swiss Bank Corporation (Oct. 16, 1996).
58. ADAM GAFFIN, EFF'S GUIDE To THE INTERNET (Formerly Big Dummy's
Guide to the Internet) 123 (1994).
59. ld.at 123-26.
60. For example, alt.drinks.snapple is a Usenet newsgroup which is devoted to
discussion and suggestions surrounding the popular beverage. There are currently
thousands of newsgroups and the number is growing faster than it can be reported.
61. PAUL GiLsTER, THE INTERNET NAVIGATOR 15 (1994).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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access these documents by typing in a "URL," or Universal Resource
Locator, or by searching for content by key word.62 By accessing the
Web, people can quickly and flexibly view information in the form
of text, images, sound and even animated video.
People can access e-mail, IRC, newsgroups and the Web by joining
a commercial or private Internet Service Provider ("ISP"), which acts
as a pipeline to the Internet.63 After registering with an ISP, the user
must also employ software which provides them with an interface to
the on-line materials.'
B. PornographyOn The Internet
The Internet is used by people world-wide to trade information on
a variety of topics. There is no doubt that some of the information
available in cyberspace is sexually explicit material, including hard
core pornography and child pornography. However, there is no
evidence to show that pornography constitutes a significant portion
of available Internet content. Users may access pornographic pictures
or text in the same way they would encounter non-sexual materials.
It is the sexually-related material, however, that the CDA seeks to
limit to the point of exclusion.
V. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 199665

The Communications Decency Act of 1996, which makes up Title
V of the Telecommunications Reform Act, was approved by the
Senate in an 84-16 vote in the summer of 1995.66 The CDA was
62. An example of a URL is http://www.netscape.com.
63. This term is to be distinguished from "content provider," which refers to

anyone who "posts" or distributes materials on-line. Examples of commercial
Internet Service Providers are America Online, CompuServe, Prodigy and
Microsoft Network.
64. An example of this software is a Web browser such as Netscape.
65. Codified, as amended, at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) to (h) (1996). Also referred to
as the Exon amendment after its proposal by Senator Jim Exon, a Democrat from
Nebraska.
66.

WILLIAM J. COOK, INTERNET & WEB LAW 1996 60 (1996); see also,

Elizabeth Corcoran, Legislationto Curb Smut On-Line is Introduced,WASHINGTON
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signed into law by President Clinton on February 8, 1996.67 The Act
restricts certain communications over computer networks by
subjecting violators to criminal penalties and fines.68
One provision of the CDA prohibits the transmission of obscene
communications via a telecommunications device, such as a computer
connected to the Internet.69 There is no dispute that obscene materials
and child pornography,7" in the eyes of the Supreme Court, are low
value speech not afforded First Amendment protection.7 To date,
nobody has brought suit challenging the obscenity provisions of the
72
Act.
A. Indecency Under The CommunicationsDecency Act
The same provision that prohibits obscene materials also limits the
transmission of indecent material on-line. Generally, section 223(a)
.subjects to prosecution anyone who, by means of a
telecommunications device makes, creates, or solicits and transmits
any comment, suggestion, proposal, request, image, or other
communication which is indecent when the transmission is
POST, July 1, 1995, at F2.

67. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, Title V, § 502,
110 Stat. 133 (1996).
68. Each intentional act of posting unlawful content is considered a separate

violation of the Act and carries with it a fine of up to $50,000, a prison term of up
to two years, or both. See, 47 U.S.C. section 223(b), (d) (1996).
69. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1996).
70. Since child pornography regulations arise from different policy
considerations and statutory regulations than does adult obscenity legislation, they
are beyond the scope of this paper.
71. Indeed the government could proscribe obscenity or child pornography
through other statutes. See, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1464-65 (1994) (criminalizing obscene
materials); 18 U.S.C. § 2251-2252 (1994) (criminalizing child pornography); see
also, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747

(1982).
72. The author, believing that people should have the right to engage in
communications of their choice while in their home, argues that current obscenity
statutes should be repealed. See, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)
(stating that if the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no

business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house what books he may read or
what films he may watch).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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B. Patently Offensive Materials Under The Act
There is a separate provision governing "patently offensive"
materials on-line. Section 223(d) of the CDA targets people who, by
the use of an interactive computer service, display sexually explicit
material that is "patently offensive" by contemporary community
standards to persons under the age of eighteen. 4 The CDA
specifically mentions the depiction or description of sexual or
73. In pertinent part Section 223(a) of the CDA subjects persons to criminal
penalties who:
(1) in interstate or foreign communications...
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly...
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communications
which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of
the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of
whether the maker of such communication placed the call
or initiated the communication;
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used
for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for
such activity.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (a)(2) (1996) (emphasis added).
74 Section 223(d) subjects anyone to criminal penalties who:
(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly...
(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request,
suggestion, proposal, image or other communication that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the use of such service placed the call
or initiated the communication; or
(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used
for such activity.
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), (d)(1), (d)(2) (1996).
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excretory organs as "patently offensive."'75
C. Safe Harbor "Defenses" Under The CDA
The CDA provides some defenses for potential violators.7 6 If
providers believe their materials fall within the scope of the Act, they
may post their materials on the Internet with a tag identifying the
adult-oriented content of the message. The two other defenses
require the content provider' 7 to demand user verification through an
adult identification number or a credit card before the user can view
the provider's materials.

75. The language of§ 223(d) parallels the definition of "indecency" in Pacifica.
76. Subsection (e) lists defenses to posting impermissible content
In addition to any other defenses available by law:
(1) No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) of this section
solely for providing access or connection to or from a facility, system or
network not under that person's control, including transmission, downloading,
intermediate storage, access software, or other related capabilities that are
incidental to providing such access or connection that does not include the
creation of the content of the communication.
(2) The defenses provided by paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be
applicable to a person who is a conspirator with an entity actively involved in
the creation or knowing distribution of communication that violate this section,
or who knowingly advertises the availability of such communications.
(3) The defenses provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not be
applicable to a person who provides access or connection to a facility, system,
or network engaged in the violation of this section that is owned or controlled
by such person.
(4) No employer shall be held liable under this section for the actions of an
employee or agent unless the employee's or agent's conduct is within the
scope of his or her employment or agency and the employer (A) having
knowledge of such conduct, authorizes or ratifies such conduct, or (B)
recklessly disregards such conduct.
47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(1) to (5) (1996).
77. Information content provider is defined as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in art, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.", 47
U.S.C. § 230 (e)(3) (1996).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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1. Tagging
A provider may limit his liability by identifying indecent or
patently offensive material by appending a tag onto the URL or on the
content page. Such a tag could take the form of "XXX" or "Overl 8."
The same protocol would be followed for posting objectionable
material on a newsgroup or inter-relay chat channel. For e-mail, the
provider would have to tag his message in the subject line in order to
warn the reader of explicit content. In theory, server or client
software would then detect the tag and either make the materials
available to the user or deny access.
2. Adult IdentificationSystem
A provider may also operate with an age verification or
identification system to deny access to minors. Typically, a user
would sign onto the system and provide personal information - name,
password, e-mail address, age - in order to register. Once registered,
the user receives an identification number which he must submit
before he may view adult-oriented materials. Many, but not all of the
systems currently in existence for this purpose, charge users for this
service.
3. Credit Card Verification
A third possible safe harbor available under the CDA is credit card
verification. Under this method, a user interested in accessing "adult
only" materials would first have to submit his credit card number to
the content provider. The credit card would then be manually
submitted by the content provider to ensure the validity of the credit
card before access would be given to the user.
D. Good FaithEfforts "Awarded"
The Act also provides a defense to liability for providers who take
reasonable, effective and appropriate actions under the circumstances
to prevent minors' access to communications falling within the scope
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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of the Act.7" These efforts include any steps "feasible under available
technology."79
VI. THE INHERENT FLAWS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY
ACT
In its quest to keep Internet users from accessing sexually-explicit
materials, Congress has drafted an unconstitutionally overbroad
statute as construed because it bans constitutionally protected speech
between adults. Furthermore, the statute is fatally vague on its face
as many terms, vital to imposing liability, are never defined by the
lawmakers. There are other less-intrusive means by which to curb
sexually-related materials to minors, including placing responsibility
on parents to monitor or prohibit their child's access to the Internet as
well as self-regulation. Finally, there are other considerations, such
as the unique nature of cyberspace, which must be explored before
current obscenity and indecency laws can be applied to Internet
materials.
A. The Communications Decency Act Is Unconstitutionally
OverbroadAs Construed
The CDA is unconstitutionally over-broad as construed because it
bans constitutionally-protected speech. It is important to note that
78. The good faith exception reads as follows:

(5)It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d) of this section,
or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an
activity under subsection (a)(1)(3) (A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate

actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by
minors to a communications specified in such subsections, which
may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such
communications, including any method which is feasible under
available technology; or
(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a
verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number.
47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) to (B) (1996).
79. Id. at (e)(5)(A).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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only 12-15% of the total population of the United States is on-line.
Just as there is only a small percentage of the population on the
Internet, only a small percentage of the material found in cyberspace
is pornographic. Furthermore, almost half of all pornographic
material found on-line comes from outside the United States - and
outside of the reach of prosecution by U.S. officials.80
The CDA, however, reaches further than the small number of users
dabbling in pornography. As applied, the "safe harbor" defenses
amount to no defense at all for violators of the Act. For tagging to
work, a provider must first decipher which material is subject to CDA
regulations and which material is not. There is no universal tag which
The software
can be recognized by the current software.
manufacturers, unlike the content providers, do not have to comply
with the Act by supplying blocking software to detect a particular tag.
It is incomprehensible to subject an individual to criminal penalties
for actions which rely on the compliance of an unwilling third party.
The problems inherent in the adult verification defense are also
numerous. On a technical level, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to register every user of sexually explicit materials. Even
if registration could be accomplished, there is no way that a provider
could ensure that someone would not register under a false name or
age - thus frustrating the very purpose of the CDA.
Registration also implicates the First Amendment free speech rights
of Internet users as well. 'Netizens, 1 be they adults or minors, rely
on the anonymity of the Internet to foster an open environment. If
users were required to register, then many people would be
discouraged from visiting certain Internet sites for fear of being
"exposed."82 Another problem is that some verification systems
require payment by the user to help reduce the costs of providing the
adult identification numbers; many users who could not afford the fee
would be precluded from free speech solely on the basis of inability
to pay.
80. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Penn. 1996).
81. A contraction of the words Internet and citizens.

82. For example, newsgroups for victims of prison rape, AIDS sufferers,
homosexuals, people who have had abortions, etc. would probably forfeit their
right to engage in free speech for fear that they might be identified.
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The credit card "defense" is also unworkable as a practical matter.
Most small-run providers do not have the capabilities or machinery
to process credit cards in their home. Assuming that all content
providers do have credit card machines at their disposal, the fees that
providers must pay to process the credit card orders would prohibit
many providers from posting their materials altogether. Although
many commercial content providers may be able to afford this
"defense," most content providers are non-profit entities unable to
pay for these services." Charging users would also be contrary to the
spirit of the Internet as well as the First Amendment. Finally, the
time it takes to manually validate credit cards would diminish the
benefit of having information immediately at your fingertips.
The credit card defense would also chill the free speech rights of
users. Unfortunately, many people who would like to access sexually
explicit materials on the 'Net do not have credit cards. In reality, it
is not reasonable to request a credit card before engaging in
objectionable speech because this safeguard cannot be applied to
"non-static" communications.8 4
Even if an individual could require a credit card from other
participants onIRC, protection under the credit card defense is
questionable."5 Because the distinction between "listener" and
"speaker" is often unclear, an individual can be participating in both
listening and speaking at the same time. The speaker/listener who
provides the credit card can still be held criminally liable for his
communication, and because he did not request a credit card from the
initiating speaker/listener, he would have no defense for
prosecution. 6
Even the good faith exception is, concededly, unavailable to
content providers facing prosecution. The problem with the good
faith exception is that it requires providers to "use all feasible and
83.

Credit card verification costs between sixty cents and one dollar per

verification. See, Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
84. Non-static communications are those such as e-mail and IRC, where the
content can be changed at any time.
85. Supplying a credit card on a public channel would preclude many users
from participation for fear of credit card fraud.
86. The CDA criminalizes the transmission of objectionable materials,
comments, suggestions or proposals regardless of who initiates the contact.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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reasonable efforts under technology" to keep pornographic materials
from minors. Unfortunately, there are currently no means available
to ensure that minors are not able to access the covered
communications.87 Thus, if there is no feasible and reasonable way
for a provider to restrict minors' access, then he could still be liable
under the Act.
Finally, if the CDA were used to prosecute indecent or patently
offensive materials, even life-saving information would be subject to
criminal penalties. Some sexually explicit materials on the Internet
serve a purpose other than to arouse the "prurient interests" of users.
People are learning of the human rights abuses against women in
Africa from graphic descriptions of genital mutilation. Women in
traditionally closed societies, such as the Middle East, are now privy
to information regarding abortions, female sexuality and reproductive
health care. Furthermore, people world-wide are provided with lifesaving, albeit descriptive, information on safer sex and the
transmission of IRV by visiting any of the thousands of AIDS Web
sites.
Contemporary art could also fall victim to censorship.8" For
example, an Internet posting regarding Angels in America, a play
about homosexuality and AIDS, uses coarse, descriptive terms which
could violate the Act. 9 However this play has won numerous awards,
including two Tony awards and a Pulitzer Prize. Even educational
materials such as National Geographic articles, could fall victim to
the Act. Cultural materials including images of the Kama Sutra or
nude ancient Greek statues could be prohibited. Museum Web pages
advertising a Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit could also be banned if
87. Even the government conceded during oral arguments for the ACLU case
that no current technology could assure a speaker that only adults were receiving
the distributed materials. See, ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
88. Counsel for the government in ACLUwas unable to define "indecency" with
specificity or to distinguish whether certain examples offered by the panel (and

listed in the same paragraph in which this footnote is referenced) would be
"indecent" and subject to prosecution.
89. The language is often vulgar and shocking and portray lewd depictions of
excretion, ejaculation, masturbation and sodomy.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

19

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 7

355

DEPAUL J ART&ENT LAW

[Vol. VII:336

samples of the artist's sexually-explicit work were posted.9"
B. The Act Is Fatally Vague Because It Chills ProtectedSpeech
The problem of vagueness in the language of the Act deters
individuals from freely disseminating their ideas on the Internet.
Because of the unclear language, the line between constitutionally
protected and unprotected speech is often blurred, thus opening the
door to subjective judgments of what is obscene, indecent or patently
offensive.
In order to protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Internet
providers, terms such as indecent, obscene and patently offensive
must be defined in the CDA, which seeks to limit the right to free
speech.91 If no definitions exist for indecent, obscene and patently
offensive, then how can we assume that content providers would be
able to accurately distinguish between protected and unprotected
speech?
A similar problem exists in that the CDA criminalizes the display
of certain images that, "in context," are patently offensive. At no
time, however, does the Act clarify what is meant by the phrase "in
context."92 Furthermore, the phrase "under his control" is never
defined to mean actual, physical control or whether it is implied
through mere ownership. A distributor may not know if he or she can
be held liable for lending his/her computer and modem to an
individual who uses it to distribute pornography on-line. A similar
problem occurs by virtue that although the statute contains a
90. Mapplethorpe is famous for his works depicting homosexual sex and objects
inserted into bodily orifices.
91. The dissent in Miller criticized the Court's failure to define obscenity and
opined that obscenity law is based on "vague and highly subjective aesthetic,

psychological and moral tests which do not provide meaningful guidance for...
juries or courts." Miller, 413 U.S. at 39-40, n.5 (Douglas, J., dissenting)(quoting
from U.S. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 53 (1970).
92. In Pacifica,the Court enunciated that "context" includes the particular

medium from which the communication originates and the community that receives
it. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978). This explanation, however, is not

helpful to explain Intemet material.
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"knowing" standard ofintent, the government has not explicitly stated
what behavior will satisfy this standard. Because of the unique nature
of computer communications, providers have no way of knowing for
sure whether the receivers of information are over eighteen.93 Finally,
the fact that nowhere in the "good faith" exception are there specific
steps by which a provider may avoid prosecution or be given
sufficient notice is another issue left unanswered by the Act.
Similarly, nowhere in the Act did the legislature explain what was
meant by the phrase "as measured by contemporary community
standards." As evident by Supreme Court precedent, there is no
national consensus on what is patently offensive or indecent.94 There
are added problems for defining the Internet community, which is a
virtual community not bound by geography or national borders.
A prime example of how problematic a community standard is on
the Internet is illustrated by United States v. Thomas.95 The
Thomases, a husband and wife, were in business selling access to an
adult-oriented bulletin board entitled "Amateur Action BBS," which
provided users with, among other items, pornographic images.96 A
Postal Inspector who was working undercover in Memphis,
Tennessee, signed onto the Thomas' California-based bulletin board
and downloaded sexually-explicit materials.97 The Inspector tipped
off federal authorities, who searched the Thomas' house and charged
them with violating anti-obscenity laws. 98 The government fought to
bring the trial to Tennessee to take advantage of the local community
standards, which it thought were more conservative than the liberal
93. Even the government conceded in oral arguments for Shea v. Reno, 930 F.
Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), that section 223(d), standing alone is not
constitutionally defensible because there is no way that a user can be certain that
his content will not reach a minor. Id. at 941.
94. Indeed even attaining a majority of the nine member Court has been difficult
on issues regarding sexually-related material.
95. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 74 (1996).
96. Id at 705.
97. Id. These images depicted images of bestiality, oral sex, incest, sadomasochistic abuse, and sex scenes involving urination. See also Joshua Quittner,
Computers in the 90's; Life in Cyberspace, the Issue of Porn on Computers,
NEWSDAY, Aug. 16, 1994, at B28.
98. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705-06.
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San Francisco standards. 99
Despite pleas from the defense, the District Court judge ruled that
the trial would be held in Memphis, as it was the Memphis
community that was affected by the pornographic materials."' The
jury, relying on the community standards of Memphis, convicted the
couple of interstate distribution of obscene materials.1"' Robert And
Carleen Thomas were sentenced to two and a half years and thirtyseven months in prison, respectively. 2 The convictions were upheld
on appeal. 103
The vagueness of the Act's terms could mean that some
constitutionally-protected communication is being restricted without
justification. If providers cannot distinguish between material which
is prohibited under the statute and material which is not, then they
simply might refuse to post their material on the Internet, thereby
chilling their constitutionally protected right to free speech.
Furthermore, the unpredictable and subjective nature of these terms
in the CDA impose criminal liability onto violators without providing
notice."'
C. NarrowerMeans To Keep PornographyFrom Children
The means chosen by the CDA sweep far broader than necessary,
99. COOK, supranote 66, at 2.
100. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710, 711. See also William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction
of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30
WAKE FOREST

L. REv. 197, 207 (1995).

101. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706; see also, James Crawley, Memphis Porn Decision
is FarReaching: Ruling Raises ConcernsAbout Rights of Online Computer Users,
SAN DiEGO UNION-TRmUNE, Aug. 16, 1994, at 9.
102. Thomas, 74 F. 3d at 706.
103. Id. at 716.
104. Although Fifth Amendment issues are beyond the scope of this update, the
problem of vagueness raises the question of notice and Due Process concerns
especially in light of Supreme Court holdings that a law which imposes

imprisonment for exercising protected speech must clearly define the prohibited
speech not only for a potential offender but for a potential enforcer as well. See,
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside,
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566
(1974).
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thereby chilling the expression of adults and over-stepping onto the
rights protected by the First Amendment. Currently there are two
non-legislative solutions to curb the flow of sexually explicit material
Several computer software manufacturers and
to children.
commercial on-line services have offered relatively inexpensive
programs that allow parents and schools to control what children can
access on-line. 5 These methods allow great flexibility in customdesigning what children view and keeps the government from
censoring on-line materials.
Prodigy, American Online and Microsoft Network offer parental
control options free of charge to their subscribers. America Online
even allows parents to establish a separate account for their children,
which is limited to the company's own propriety content. Parents are
given the opportunity to decide what types or categories of
information they want shielded from their children and then block it
from the child's account. The other, more "child-friendly" material
will then be the only information the child can access through it's
account.
Cyber Patrol and SurfWatch are software programs that allow
children to reap the benefits of the Internet without being exposed to
objectionable material. 1" These screening tools maintain lists of sites
known to contain sex-related materials, and attempts to access these
materials are blocked. In addition, these-programs have the ability to
block access to sites which contain certain words such as "sex," and
block any searches including those words. The SurfWatch program
also empowers parents to exercise individual choice by blocking
access to all Internet sites except those which the parents choose to
make available for their children.
In addition, the World Wide Web Consortium has launched PICS,
the Platform for Internet Content Selection, which develops technical
standards so that electronic ratings can be attached to Internet
addresses. Parents can purchase PICS-compatible software and
105. These programs range from free to approximately $49.95.
106. CyberNOT enables parents to selectively block access to any or all of the
following twelve categories: Violence/Profanity; Partial Nudity; Nudity; Sexual
Acts; Gross Depictions; Racism/Ethnic Impropriety; Satanic/Cult; Drugs/Drug
culture; Militant/Extremist; Gambling; Questionable/Illegal; Alcohol, Beer &
Wine. The system receives automatic updates every seven days.
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configure it so that it detects specific PICS tags. These PICS tags,
designed to suit the parents' needs or values, can block objectionable
material once detected.
There is also a second solution to control materials distributed online. Self-regulation is a simple and costless option."' Selfregulation places the responsibility on users to be cautious about what
information they distribute and where the materials are disseminated.
Self-regulation, however, is not without it's problems -- many people
who prey on children (and for whom the legislation was drafted) will
not practice self-regulation of sexually-explicit ideas and materials.
D. The Unique Nature Of Cyberspace - A Test Of First
Amendment Principles
The Internet presents unique problems in applying current
obscenity and indecency standards. The Supreme Court has
recognized that each medium of expression is capable of presenting
Unlike other
unique problems for First Amendment jurisprudence.'
from a
clearly
broadcast
word
is
media, where the written or spoken
defined source, the distinction between speaker and listener is unclear
for Internet communications. The entrance barriers for listeners and
speakers are virtually identical. The users and providers are active
participants in speech. They are not merely passive listeners taking
part in public discourse. Because of the problems of defining speaker
and listener on the Internet, the traditional notions of constitutionallyprotected "speech" must be re-worked to encompass this inter-active
medium. The legal standards that govern the Internet must also
change to reflect that progress. Specifically, the special qualities of
this global forum demand the broadest protection afforded by the
courts.
107. Even Vice-President Gore prefers voluntary self-regulation to accessing
and posting obscenity on the Internet. Thomas Brazaitis, Computer Network
Creates Thorny Ethics Problem,PLAiN DEALER, July 31, 1994, at I0A.
108. This differential treatment for various communications media is not new
for First Amendment cases. See, FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); City
of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
500-01 (1981) (plurality opinion).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7

24

Spiliopoulos: The Commuications Decency Act of 1996

1997]

COMMUNICATIONS DECENCYACT

360

VII. RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE CoMMuNICATIONs DECENCY
ACT

There have been two cases that have challenged the
constitutionality of the Act on overbreadth and vagueness grounds.
Both facial challenges were heard by a three-judge panel comprised
of District Court judges, as required by statute.'09
A. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno
The first case to challenge the Act, American CivilLiberties Union
v. Reno,"' was filed on the day the Act was signed.... Two weeks
109. The two provisions governing the three-judge panel requirement, section
561 of Pub. L. 104-104 and 28 U.S.C. § 2284, are as follows:
§ 561 EXPEDITED REVIEW. (a) THREE JUDGE DISTRICT
COURT HEARING - Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, any civil action challenging the constitutionality, on its face,
of this title or any amendment made by this title, or any
provision thereof, shall be heard by a district court of 3 judges
convened pursuant to the provisions of section 2284 of title 28,
United States Code.
Pub. L. 104-104, Title V, § 561(a), 110 Stat. 133.
§ 2284. Three-judge court; when required; composition;
procedure
(b) In any action required to be heard and determined by a
district court of three judges under subsection (a) of this section,
the composition and procedure of the court shall be as follows
(3) A single judge may conduct all proceedings except the trial
...He may grant a temporary restraining order on a specific
finding, based on evidence submitted, that specified irreparable
damage will result if the order is not granted, which order, unless
previously revoked by the district judge, shall remain in force
only until the hearing and determination by the district court of
three judges of an application for a preliminary injunction[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2284.
110. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Penn. 1996).
111. COOK, supra note 66, at 20. Plaintiffs filed their action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See, Complaint, Civil
Action No. 96-963 (E.D. Penn. 1996). Plaintiffs moved to enjoin the enforcement
of the indecent and patently offensive provisions of the CDA. Id. After an
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later, the ACLU legal challenge was supported by a similar action
brought by the American Library Association, the Center for
Democracy and Technology, several civil rights groups, on-line
services and software corporations." 2 After the consolidation of the
two cases, the plaintiff class was composed of businesses, libraries,
non-commercial
and non-profit organizations, educational societies
113
and consortia.
The matter was brought before a three-judge panel on plaintiff s
motion for a preliminary injunction of the indecency and patently
offensive provisions of the CDA." 4 The plaintiffs disputed the
provisions of the Act on grounds of both vagueness and overbreadth,
claiming that the law limited ideas on the Internet to the least tolerant

community.1

5

The three-judge panel of the District Court held that the provisions
at issue violated the First Amendment right to free speech and
expression." 6 All three panel judges found that the statute could not
withstand constitutional scrutiny because it was substantially
overbroad.' 7 Furthermore, two of the judges found § 223(d), the
patently offensive provision, to be unconstitutionally vague."' On
June 11, 1996, the court granted the ACLU's motion for a preliminary
injunction preventing the U.S. Department of Justice from enforcing
the patently offensive and indecent provisions of the law.1" 9

evidentiary hearing on February 15, 1996, Judge Buckwalter granted a limited
temporary restraining order, finding that the indecency provision of the CDA was

unconstitutionally vague. Id.
112. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827-28.
113. Id. at 824. After the consolidation, the cases were collectively referred to
as "the Philadelphia litigation."
114. Id. at 827-28.
115. COOK, supranote 66, at 20.
116. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 824.
117. Id. at 853-55 (Sloviter, C.J.); Id. at 857 (Buckwalter, J.); Id. at 869
(Dalzell, J.).
118. Id. at 856 (Sloviter, C.J.); Id. at 861 (Buckwalter, J.).
119. However, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno has stated that if the Supreme
Court holds that the CDA is constitutional, the Department of Justice retains the
right to prosecute violations which occurred between the enactment of the CDA
and the Court's decision. Id. at 827.
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B. Shea v. Reno
A follow-up case to the Philadelphia litigation also reviewed the
validity of the CDA. In Shea v. Reno,120 the editor-in-chief, publisher
and part-owner of an electronic newspaper published an editorial
criticizing the Act on the day that it was signed into law."' Some of
the material in the editorial could have arguable fallen within the
provision criminalizing the display of patently offensive materials.' 22
Plaintiff Joe Shea filed suit on behalf of his company, the American
Reporter, seeking a declaration that the Act was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad in that it banned protected communications
between adults."2 A little more than a week later, plaintiff also
sought a4preliminary injunction to bar the enforcement of section
12
223(d).
After review, the three-judge panel held that: (1) the Act's
incorporation of the FCC's indecency standard did not make the
section unconstitutionally vague; (2) the provision would have to
survive a strict scrutiny analysis to survive an overbreadth challenge;
(3) the statute was overbroad as it totally banned constitutionally
protected, indecent speech between adults; and (4) the affirmative
defenses for violators of the Act do not save the statute from being
over-inclusive.'
The Supreme Court granted certiorarifor the two cases, which
were consolidated, to resolve the constitutional issues surrounding the
CDA. Oral arguments were heard in mid-March, 1997.126 In making
it's ruling, it is hoped that the Court will not only question the
120. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
121. Id. at 922, 923.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 923-24.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 950.

126. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996); See also, Michael Kirkland, US.
Files Internet 'Indecency'Appeal,WASHINGTON NEws, Oct. 1, 1996. President

Clinton has since appealed to the Supreme Court to save the federal ban on
indecency on the Internet. Id. Vice-President Al Gore, however, is a leading
proponent of the Internet and was reluctant to support governmental regulation of
Internet content. Thomas Brazaitis, Computer Network Creates Thorny Ethics
Problem, PLAIN DEALER, July 31, 1994, at 10A.
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constitutionality of the Act, but will also announce a broad First
Amendment standard for Internet speech.

CONCLUSION

Protecting the well-being of children is indeed a valid reason for
enacting the Communications Decency Act of 1996. However, in the
government's quest to control the content of the Internet, it has
essentially banned adults from engaging in constitutionally-protected
speech.
The policy rationale for prohibiting the distribution of obscene
materials is not applicable to the dissemination of information on the
Internet. With the exception of electronic mail, sexually-explicit
content does not appear on a user's screen without the user having
first taken some affirmative steps. Although there is a potential for
occasional, accidental viewing of sex-related content, the user must
still put forth the initial effort of accessing the system. Moreover,
most sexually-explicit materials on-line are proceeded by explicit
warnings, and many require express confirmation from the user
before displaying the pornography. Even if a user is confronted with
sex-related materials, the user can simply "click" off the
objectionable material in seconds. The danger of a very small child
"accidentally" viewing pornography on-line is almost negligible
because a child would require both a certain sophistication to operate
the computer as well as the ability to read.
The steps to find pornography, or any materials on-line, are much
more labor-intensive then simply turning the dial of a television or
flipping the on switch of a radio. The Internet presents no danger of
offending unwilling participants as was the case in Pacifica,nor is the
material unsolicited as in Miller. Virtually no Internet participant is
taken by sutprise by content and there is no problem of a captive
audience. The Internet is even less intrusive than the sexual speech
in Sable. Where access to "dial-a-porn" requires only the use of a
telephone, which is found in virtually every home, the Internet
requires the use of a telephone line, modem and computer. Unlike
community newsstands, bookstores or movie theaters, the Internet
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/7
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carries little or no risk for obscene material to be in the public eye
because Internet users generally access these materials in the privacy
of their homes.
The most effective way to keep children from viewing sexually
explicit material is not by prosecuting content providers for sharing
their ideas, but rather by placing the burden on concerned parents to
monitor their own computer. It is the parents and others responsible
for minors that undertake the primary obligation to prevent the
children's exposure to sexually explicit materials.
Because of the nature of this new communication medium, the
Internet presents unique problems in First Amendment jurisprudence.
As such, the Internet must be considered separately from all other
media and afforded the broadest freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution and bestowed by the courts.

Elaine M. Spiliopoulos
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